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Essay 1 
 
An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Credit Default Swap Rates 
on Short-Term Interest Rates 
 
Abstract 
 
In this study, we empirically investigate the impact of credit default swap rates on short-
term interest rates. We find that CDS rates significantly impact short-term interest rates. 
The impact remains significant after controlling for inflation and unemployment. 
Applying co-integration test and vector error correction modeling, the study also finds a 
causal relationship between CDS rates and short-term interest rates. These 
relationships are confirmed through autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(ARCH), exponential generalized ARCH [EGARCH] and vector auto-regression (VAR) 
analyses. The empirical results have important implications in setting short-term interest 
rates. A regular revision of policy targeting to capture the continual changes in CDS 
rates is inferred.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) rates on short-
term interest rates policy. CDS is essentially an insurance policy that protects a buyer 
against the loss of principal on a bond in case of a default by the insurer. The buyer of 
the CDS is obliged to pay periodic premium to the seller over the life of the contract. 
The use of credit default swaps increased over time. Between 2002 and 2007, gross 
notional amounts outstanding grew from below USD 2 trillion to nearly USD 60 trillion. 
By the end of 2007, the outstanding amount was $62.2 trillion, falling to $38.6 trillion by 
the end of 2008. Currently, CDS is the dominant credit derivative with almost 50% 
market share. The primary purpose of a credit default swap contract is to provide 
protection to the purchaser of a debt instrument in case of default or a related credit 
event, serving as credit quality, or to hedge a long position in the debt or equity of a 
reference entity. An investor in a CDS contract pays an annual premium to the seller of 
the contract. If a credit event such as default of the underlying reference entity occurs, 
the seller buys the underlying debt instrument from the investor at par. The annual 
premium thus reflects the market price of the credit risk with respect to the underlying 
instrument. 
Over the last few years, large-scale use of financial derivatives including CDS, 
has become a key feature of financial markets and this utilization continues to grow. 
The unprecedented pace and growth of these financial derivatives has been a driving 
force in the financial system. In fact, Townend (1995) reported that the growth and use 
of derivatives has impacted the quality indicator of monetary policy including monetary 
and credit aggregates.  
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There are several ways in which the growth of derivatives has impacted the 
short-term interest rates and monetary policy. Firstly, derivatives have changed the 
demand for money, as evidenced by reduced transaction costs, and low-cost risk 
management alternatives which reduces the speculative demand for money (Mullins, 
1997). Secondly, derivatives provide competing alternatives to the broader monetary 
aggregates; this is because the low-cost hedging of the price risk of traded assets has 
transformed market instruments into lower-risk instruments that compete with interest-
bearing components of the broad-aggregates (Mullins, 1997). Thirdly, the growth and 
use of derivatives has also impacted credit aggregates through its impacts on the 
improvements in risk management. This capability enables banks to lend out more 
flexible credit alternatives on improved terms to borrowers. 
1.1 Overview of Financial Derivative Products 
Derivatives comprise a broad range of products that impute their values from 
varying asset classes. They include equity, interest rate, commodity, foreign exchange 
and credit derivatives. Equity futures and options on broad equity indices are the most 
commonly cited equity derivatives. They are useful hedging instruments. Trading in 
these products commenced in 1982. Other traded equity derivatives are equity-swaps in 
which an investor pays the return on a stock and receives in return a floating rate. 
Interest rate swap is the most popular interest rate derivative. Here, for example, a bank 
may agree to make payments to a counterparty based on a floating rate in exchange for 
a fixed interest rate payment. In another form, interest rate futures contract allows a 
buyer to lock in a future investment rate. This is useful due to their ability to provide 
information on market expectations of future monetary policy decisions by the Federal 
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Reserve in the US (Carlson et al 2006). Credit derivatives are touted as the earliest 
market because of problems encountered with storage, delivery and seasonal patterns. 
It allows price volatility to be effectively hedged to better reflect the market supply and 
demand situations. 
Foreign exchange derivatives arose due to the increasing financial and trade 
integration across countries. Participants demanded protection against exchange rate 
movements. A forward exchange contract is stated as the popular tool for hedging. 
Another type is the use of cross-currency swaps in which parties involved exchange 
payments of principals and interest in different currencies. 
Finally, credit derivatives come into play when a participant makes a promise to 
pay another contingent upon the occurrence of a credit event. The credit event could be 
failing to pay, filing for bankruptcy, etc. The fastest growing among credit derivatives is 
the credit default swaps (CDS). Hence this essay focuses on the impact of CDS rates 
on short-term interest rates policy. 
1.2 Overview of Federal Funds Rates (Short-Term Interest Rates) 
The short-term interest rates are of fundamental importance to financial markets. 
Interest rates are key inputs into the valuation of securities that are traded in the 
financial markets. Theoretical research has sought to understand short term interest 
rates. Empirical research on interest rates include valuation, prediction and hedging. 
The Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) is charged with maintaining the stability of the 
nation's financial system and takes actions to raise or lower short-term interest rates in 
an effort to keep the economy stable. When the Fed cuts short-term rates, it does so by 
cutting the rate that banks charge each other to borrow money. The rate reduction is 
6 
 
eventually passed on to businesses and consumers. The same thing happens in the 
reverse when the Fed raises short-term rates. 
In a growing economy, companies become more profitable, there is low 
unemployment rate and consumers’ spending increases. In such situations, the Fed 
acts to raise short-term rates to prevent inflation. However, raising interest rates slows 
the economy. Higher interest rates mean higher borrowing costs for individuals and 
businesses, and that usually means there is less money to spend elsewhere. 
On the other hand, when the economy is contracting, the Fed nudges short-term 
rates lower. Lowering rates makes it less expensive to borrow money. Consumers and 
businesses can afford to buy more products and services. That speeds up the 
economy, keeps people employed, and keeps the economy from sinking into a 
recession.  
1.3  Derivatives Impact on Federal Funds Rates (Short-Term Interest Rates)  
Interest rates are the main transmission mechanism of monetary policy. A 
tightening of monetary policy leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate, which in 
turn translates to an increase in the real interest rate due to price stickiness. This real 
interest rate increase reduces investment and consequently output falls. 
A growing number of studies have argued that derivatives increase the speed 
with which monetary policy actions are transmitted through the financial system. Vrolijk 
(1997) analyzed the effect of the broader derivatives markets on the channels of 
monetary policy transmission. He argues that derivatives trading speeds up the effect of 
policy transmission on financial asset prices. This is because of the derivatives’ ability to 
lower transaction cost and reduce frictions. As such, new information is easily 
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incorporated into asset prices. This effect is supported by Cohen (1996), who found that 
derivatives accelerate the incorporation of new information into asset prices. Mullins 
(1997) concluded that derivatives have increased the liquidity, depth, flexibility and 
transactional efficiency of foreign markets thereby enhancing trading and hedging 
opportunities.  
The transmission mechanisms of monetary policy work through various 
channels, affecting different variables and different markets at various speeds, which 
can be intensified by the presence of derivatives. As indicated earlier, the main channel 
is the short-term interest rates. Although derivatives may affect the relation between 
interest rates and aggregate spending through the redistribution of risk, the sensitivity of 
spending is affected to the extent derivative can facilitate the shifting of the risk. 
From the above overviews, it is apparent that the derivative market is well 
established yet studies of the impacts of the market on the link between short-term 
interest rates policy induced changes in the financial variables, aggregate spending and 
inflation have resulted in less substantial conclusions. It seems natural to query whether 
large policy actions would be necessary to achieve a target result for aggregate 
spending. A second query appears to be should the setting of interest rates be re-
examined or recalibrated to reflect the effectiveness of innovations in financial and 
economic environments? It is time policy makers re-examined the impact of derivative 
markets on policy because several studies have shown various impacts on different 
financial market and products. The rationale of the study is threefold: to inform short-
term interest rates policy formulation and interventions, to understand the behavior of 
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interest rates policy due to changes in the financial sector and the need for central 
banks to monitor developments in financial innovation.  
The empirical results yield some interesting findings on the impact of CDS rates 
on short-term interest rates. First, the results indicate a negative relation between fed 
funds rates (short-term rates) and CDS rates even after controlling for inflation and 
unemployment. The regression model improves with the introduction of auto-regression 
that accounted for almost 30% persistency. Vector error correction modeling indicates 
both short and long run association between CDS rates and the short-term interest 
rates. Finally, the study finds that these results are confirmed with ARCH/EGARCH and 
impulse response analysis. The study also finds that in setting short-term interest rates, 
central banks need to closely monitor the financial markets.  
The study contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, the study 
extends the literature on the roles of CDS rates on short-term fed funds rates. Second, 
these findings contribute to literature on the need for central banks to understand the 
behavior of fed fund rates due to changes in the financial sector. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II of the paper 
presents literature review covering available papers on the subject. Section III discusses 
the data description and summary statistics. Section 4 presents the econometric 
analyses conducted and discusses the results from the analyses. The Conclusion, 
Section IV, presents summary, findings of the study and provides some policy 
recommendations. 
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2.0 RELATED LITERATURE 
Financial innovation has been a driving force in the financial system. Tufano 
(2002) broadly categorizes financial innovations into two types, product and process 
innovations. Product innovation can be illustrated by corporate securities or derivative 
contracts, while process innovation can be demonstrated by new means of distributing 
securities, processing transactions or payment system technologies. The emergence of 
financial derivatives is perhaps the most notable financial innovation. Since derivatives 
play a crucial role in risk management, they exert considerable influence on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, which works through the financial system and its 
efficacy requires a stable and functioning market place.   
Financial innovation has widespread impact on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. For example, per Singh et al (2008), the use of derivatives has two important 
implications for monetary transmission. First, it may improve transmission by extending 
the impact of changes in policy rates from short-term interest rates to the prices of 
assets in other markets as derivatives increase asset substitutability across financial 
markets. A second implication of the greater use of derivatives is that it may help create 
a less abrupt or extreme financial market reaction to monetary policy changes because 
these instruments are designed to help hedge firms from unexpected changes in their 
revenues and debt-servicing costs.  
Fender (2000) investigated the impact of corporate risk management strategies 
on monetary policy transmission. He used a single model of a broad credit channel of 
monetary policy transmission to argue that information asymmetries create incentives 
for corporate hedging programs. These policies in turn diminish the impact of monetary 
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measures and is reduced to a cost of capital effect. In an earlier related study, Froot et 
al (1993) had shown that if information asymmetries increase the cost of external 
finance, incentives are created for firms to manage corporate risk. Derivative 
instruments allow firms to manage such financial risk in a way that grant them protection 
against changes in the monetary policy stance thereby reducing the real effects of 
monetary policy.  
Hirtle (2009) explores whether the use of credit derivatives is associated with an 
increase in bank credit supply. He found limited evidence, thereby concluding that the 
benefits of the growth in credit derivatives may be narrow. This finding is supported by 
Goderies et at (2001). They found that banks that adopted advanced credit risk 
management techniques experience a permanent increase in their target loans levels of 
around 50%. 
Gomez et al (2005) studied derivatives markets’ impact on Colombian monetary 
policy. Utilizing an investment model, the impact of the use of interest rate and 
exchange rate derivatives in the dilution of the Colombian monetary channels is verified. 
However, their empirical study suggests that monetary policy lost effectiveness only in 
the short run. In a similar study, Loutskina and Straha (2006) and Edwards and Mishkin 
(1996) also find evidence of the weakening of bank lending with the advent of financial 
innovation such as derivative instruments. 
Studies by Ignazio (2007) indicate that financial innovation has opened up new 
opportunities in the financial sector and have increased markets participants. These 
developments have increased the range of financing and investments, and have also 
changed the role of banks to include expanded diversification in terms of their portfolios 
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and sources of liquidation. Such developments have affected the speed and strength of 
monetary policy transmission in the economy. This has resulted in more complete and 
liquid financial markets. Changes in interest rates are more readily transmitted to the 
whole term structure and more generally to asset prices. The increasing use of financial 
and non-financial assets in firms and households implies that the effect of monetary 
policy through changes in asset prices and related wealth effects are likely becoming 
larger while weakening the bank lending channel. This is, in part, because a wide range 
of borrowers are now able to use financial markets as a substitute for sources of 
funding. The relevance of the bank lending channel is thus affected negatively by the 
emergence of non-bank lenders. 
Per Noyer (2007), financial innovation fosters rapid dissemination of information 
and its faster incorporation into the financial markets. This is especially true for 
monetary policy decisions and can therefore increase the effectiveness of monetary 
policy transmission, particularly, via the interest rate channel. In addition, Noyer (2007) 
indicates that financial innovation contributes to an increased holding of financial assets 
by lowering transaction costs and facilitating arbitrage, hedging, funding and investment 
strategies. Financial innovation also gives firms broader access to securities markets, 
which may reduce information asymmetries at the source of the credit channel and 
therefore weakens this channel. Also, financial innovation, per Noyer (2007), results in 
greater integration of domestic and international markets. This should strengthen the 
exchange rate channel as exchange rates become more sensitive to interest rates 
differential between currency areas. 
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Ho (2006) examined the linkages among financial innovation, growth and 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms. The author identifies interest rate channel, 
exchange rate channel and asset channel as the three main channels through which 
financial innovation can affect monetary policy. He argues that monetary policy targeted 
at aspects of macroeconomic variables is essentially a financial process, with the 
financial system as the interface linking central banks policies and the real economy 
through monetary policy transmission mechanisms. Hence, any innovative development 
that affects the structure and conditions of financial markets will have the potential to 
also influence transmission mechanisms. Ho (2009) further indicates that financial 
innovation influences the structure of financial markets, the financial behavior of 
economic agents and the types of financial products traded. It therefore influences the 
entire monetary transmission mechanism, and adds uncertainty to the financial 
environment in which central bank conducts monetary operations. 
Resina (2004) appears to agree with Ignazio’s (2007) findings by contending that 
financial innovation tends to make existing relation between monetary and non-
monetary variables much more unstable and unpredictable. This is because the range 
of financial assets available and their increased substitutability have made monetary 
aggregates difficult to interpret. Thus, there has been a trend toward downgrading 
quantitative targets and focusing on levels of interest rates and exchange rates. 
Therefore, in a changing financial environment, it is inappropriate to use any one 
monetary variable as the sole guide for monetary policy. 
 Sang (2005) indicates that the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism hinges on changing forms and character of financial diversity and the depth 
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of financial markets. In this context, the author indicates that with the increasing role of 
capital markets, investors have greater option to diversify their financing away from 
banks through the issuing of bonds and equities. Accordingly, such changes in the 
financial system impact the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
In another study, Singh et al (2008) examined how monetary transmission 
mechanism is affected by financial development. In this empirical study, the authors 
used two-step Engle-Granger ECM approach to obtain a long-run relationship between 
market rate of interest and policy rate. The authors then used simple cross-country 
correlations to gauge the strength of the association between interest rate pass-through 
and various measures of financial developments including financial innovation 
indicators. They found that financial market development strengthens the asset price 
channel, weakens impact of monetary policy on bank lending channel and has mixed 
impact on the balance sheet channel. According to their results, financial market 
development leads to faster and larger interest rate pass through. While some aspects 
of financial market development strengthen the interest rate channel, advancement of 
payment technology which enables consumption smoothening weakens the importance 
of the interest rate channel. 
In summary, the related literature review indicates that financial innovation have 
widespread impacts on interest rates transmission mechanisms with disparate 
implications on their effectiveness. Financial innovations create new products and 
systems of financial services delivery that should not be ignored in the setting of short-
term interest rates. It is imperative to understand how interest rates policy affects the 
economy at a point in time, and policy-makers must have an accurate assessment of 
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the timing and effect of their policies on the economy. Hence this study will seek to 
interpret how the increasing and varied use of derivative products, in particular CDS 
rates, can inform the setting of short-term interest rates policy. 
 This paper aims to extend the existing literature by examining how CDS rates 
influence the short-term interest rates policy. It is important that the real effects of CDS 
rates shocks are well understood and considered by central banks in policy formulation. 
3.0 DATA DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS  
The choice of variables in this study is driven by a recursive identification 
strategy, as in Hamilton and Jorda (2002). The recursive identification strategy allows 
one to see whether there is any evidence that short-term interest rates policy has 
changed over time. Other variables included in the analysis are motivated by 
consideration of macroeconomic variables that are likely to influence policy objectives. 
Accordingly, the model uses monthly data on the logarithm of CDS rates, effective 
federal funds rate, logarithm of inflation, and unemployment (as indicated by total 
nonfarm payrolls in percent change). The data used in the study covered the period 
November 2005 to August 2016. Monthly short-term interest rates policy data were 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Database [FRED] and monthly CDS rates 
data from Bloomberg.  
The results indicate that over the study period, short-term interest rates, CDS 
rates, inflation and unemployment had, respectively, means of 1.27, 89.52, 94.35 and 
0.06. Computations of standard deviations resulted in 1.94, 40.20, 5.55 and 0.19 for the 
short-term interest rates, CDS rates, inflation and unemployment, respectively. Table 1 
presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the study.  To depict the 
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variations of the policy variables over the study period, plots are provided in Illustrations 
1 and 2.  
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Summary statistics of policy variables. The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of 
monthly data for fed funds rates, derivatives, inflation and unemployment are presented. 
  
 No. of 
Observations 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Federal Funds 
Rate 
(fedfunds) 
130 1.27 0.16 5.26 0.07 1.94 
CDS Rates 
(cds) 130 89.52 85.31 238.6 31.43 40.20 
Inflation  
(inflation) 
 
 
130 94.35 95.90 101.70 83.23 5.55 
Unemployment 
(unemploy) 
 
130 0.06 0.11 0.40 0.00 0.19 
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Illustration 1 – Variation of 
Derivatives and Inflation Over Study 
Period 
 
Illustration 2 – Variation of Federal Funds 
Rate and Unemployment Over Study Period 
 
4.0 EMPIRICAL TESTS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Correlation 
First a correlation test was conducted among the variables. This is to test and avoid 
multi-collinearity in the estimated model. The correlation results are presented in Table 
2 below.   
 
Table 2 – Correlation Analysis 
Pairwise correlation of variables utilized in the study.  
 
 FEDFUNDS CDS INFLATION UNEMPLOY 
FEDFUNDS 1 -0.491837 -0.788093 0.04106400 
CDS -0.491837 1 0.0420011 -0.740771 
INFLATION -0.788093 0.0420011 1 0.361260 
UNEMPLOY 0.04106400 -0.740771 0.361260 1 
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Stationarity of Variables 
Since the study used monthly data over a longer period from 2005 to 2016 it was 
important to test for the stationarity of the variables. This is characterized by the Unit Root 
Test Process. The Augmented Dickey Fuller Test is the preferred method of unit root test. 
The data at levels are not stationary but all became stationary at the First (1st) Difference. 
D(variable) as utilized in this study transforms the variables to 1st difference. 
Ordinary Least Square Regression (OLS) 
 I first examined how CDS rates, inflation and unemployment impact the short-
term interest rates by utilizing the following regression models: 
𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 = ∝  + 𝛽1(𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆) +  𝑢𝑡       (1) 
𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 = ∝  + 𝛽1(𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆) +  𝛽2(𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽3(𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦) +  𝑢𝑡 (2)  
Where fedfunds is the short-term interest rates, ΔCDS is the change in credit default 
swaps rates, unemploy is the unemployment rate (as indicated by total nonfarm 
payrolls) and ut is the error term. α, is the regression intercept, β1, β2 and β3 are the 
coefficients of the independent variables. Equation (1) is the base model and equation 
(2) controls for inflation and unemployment.  
Utilizing the above models, a conventional regression analysis using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) is ran to ascertain a relation between fedfunds, CDS rates, inflation 
and unemployment for the monthly data from 2005 to 2016. The empirical results are 
presented in Tables 2 and 3 below. As seen in the Tables, interest rates and CDS rates 
move in opposite directions. However, the p-value indicates that CDS rates are highly 
significant in impacting the short-term interest rates.  
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Table 3 – OLS Regression Output of Base Model 
Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.026913 0.012654 -2.126832 0.0354 
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.320065 0.089279 -3.585002 0.0005 
     
     R-squared 0.091899      
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000479    
 
Table 4 – OLS Regression Output of Controlling Model 
Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.032765 0.013078 -2.505301 0.0135 
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.268832 0.092634 -2.902097 0.0044 
D(LOG(INFLATION)) 4.013502 2.436160 1.647471 0.1020 
D(UNEMPLOY) 0.096136 0.128961 0.745464 0.4574 
     
     R-squared 0.117855      
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001284    
     
     
 
Auto-Regression Analysis 
  Although the OLS resulted in a robust model, an auto-regression (AR) model 
was also estimated. As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6 below, AR(8) fits very well the 
time series residuals. Thus, the time series residuals exhibit an auto-regression with up 
to eight (8) lags. Also from Tables 5 and 6, a decrease in CDS rates  results in 
increasing in short term rates. In other words, a tightening of short-term interest rates 
results in a decrease in CDS rates.  It is seen that both reactions show much 
significance with p-values less than 5%. The AR(8) component implies about 39%  
persistency in the monthly short-term rates.  
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Table 5 – OLS Regression Output of Base Model with Auto-Regression 
Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.019270 0.025787 -0.747252 0.4563 
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.244926 0.064830 -3.777970 0.0002 
AR(8) 0.385432 0.041007 9.399186 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.222428      
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
     
      
Table 6 – OLS Regression Output of Controlling Model with Auto-Regression 
Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.024431 0.026857 -0.909646 0.3648 
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.199613 0.064599 -3.090009 0.0025 
D(LOG(INFLATION)) 3.444731 1.464968 2.351404 0.0203 
D(UNEMPLOY) 0.048748 0.165627 0.294326 0.7690 
AR(8) 0.387079 0.048771 7.936669 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.243639      
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
     
      
The existence of correlation does not imply causality nor co-integration. These 
are aspects that will be analyzed in the next sections. 
Co-Integration Test  
The purpose of this test is to ascertain whether the variables are co-integrated in 
the short or long run. Lag intervals in the 1st difference were used in this test. Johansen 
Test was utilized in this analysis. Outputs from the Co-Integration Test are given in the 
Appendix. The results indicate co-integration among the variables exist. Tables 7 and 8 
present the co-integration analysis. 
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Table 7 – Co-integration Test for Base Model 
 
Series: FEDFUNDS LOG(CDS)    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 13  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.108219  18.51147  15.49471  0.0170 
At most 1 *  0.044048  5.225505  3.841466  0.0223 
     
      Trace test indicates 2 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 
Table 8 – Co-integration Model for Controlling Model 
 
Series: FEDFUNDS CDS INFLATION UNEMPLOY   
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 13  
     
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.301438  78.58313  47.85613  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.162962  36.97023  29.79707  0.0063 
At most 2 *  0.070969  16.33546  15.49471  0.0373 
At most 3 *  0.065001  7.796302  3.841466  0.0052 
     
      Trace test indicates 4 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
     
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.301438  41.61290  27.58434  0.0004 
At most 1  0.162962  20.63477  21.13162  0.0585 
At most 2  0.070969  8.539159  14.26460  0.3265 
At most 3 *  0.065001  7.796302  3.841466  0.0052 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
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Causality Analysis 
Vector Error Correction Model 
With co-integration established, the VECM was run on the variables to determine 
causality between the short-term interest rates and CDS rates. This was achieved by 
developing a Model with short term interest rates as the dependent variable and CDS 
rates as the independent variables. As can be seen from Table 9 below, the coefficients 
of the error terms (C1) are all negative. These suggest that the variables have a long run 
causality relationship from CDS rates to short term interest rates. However, for the 
controlling model specification, the coefficient is insignificant since its p-value of 46.49% 
is greater than 5%.  
For the model developed a co-efficient diagnosis analysis was then conducted to 
ascertain either a short run or long run causality using the Wald Test. With probabilities, 
greater than 5%, the results indicate that CDS rates influence short term interest rates 
also in the short run. The results of the Wald Test are also provided in the Appendix. 
Table 9 – Vector Error Correction Modeling 
 
In the base and controlling models, the coefficients are negative and significant only for the base model. 
This implies long run causality running from CDS to FFR. Thus, CDS influence short term interest rates in 
the long run with the causality running from CDS to short-term interest rates. 
 
 Base Model 
(C1) 
Probability (R2) Controlling 
Model (C1) 
Probability (R2) 
CDS Rates -0.007892 0.0042 (71.06%) -0.003130 0.4649 
(80.35%) 
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ARCH / EGARCH Analysis 
Examination of the regression residuals plot below suggests that the residuals 
exhibit volatility clustering, that is variability is smaller for earlier years before the 
financial crisis, increased apparently during the crisis and return to minimal variability 
thereafter. As such, an EGARCH(1,1) model specification was assumed appropriate for 
the series. 
 
Illustration 3 – Regression Residuals 
The EGARCH models the logarithm of the variance (or standard deviation) as a 
function of the lagged log(variance) and the lagged absolute error from the regression 
model. It also allows the response to the lagged error to be asymmetric, so that positive 
regression residuals can have a different effect on variance than an equivalent negative 
residual. Following Nelson (1991), let Zt  denote a series of independent and identically 
distributed standardized random variables with expectation 0 and variance 1, the 
EGARCH model is of the form: 
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
-1.2 
-0.8 
-0.4 
0.0 
0.4 
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23 
 
log 𝜎𝑡
2 =  𝛽1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑔(𝑍𝑡−𝑘
∞
𝑘=1
) 
Where 𝛽1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝑘 are deterministic coefficients. 
𝑔(𝑍𝑡) =  𝜃𝑍𝑡 +  𝛾(|𝑍𝑡| − 𝐸|𝑍𝑡|) 
𝐸[𝑔(𝑍𝑡)] = 0 
As indicated in Table 10 below, an ARCH effect exist in the model since observed R-
squared has a significant probability of 0.91%. 
Table 10 – ARCH Test 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
     
     F-statistic 7.071249    Prob. F(1,126) 0.0089 
Obs*R-squared 6.801769    Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0091 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.013271 0.006353 2.088831 0.0387 
RESID^2(-1) 0.230535 0.086694 2.659182 0.0089 
     
      
 
Table 11 – EGARCH Test 
 
Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
Method: ML ARCH - Generalized error distribution (GED) (BFGS / Marquardt 
        steps)    
GED parameter fixed at 2   
LOG(GARCH) = C(4) + C(5)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + C(6) 
        *RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(7)*LOG(GARCH(-1)) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.003772 0.001040 -3.627773 0.0003 
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.080707 0.004985 -16.19073 0.0000 
AR(8) -0.076794 0.008415 -9.125477 0.0000 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C(4) -5.244092 0.396713 -13.21886 0.0000 
C(5) 2.253551 0.182905 12.32086 0.0000 
C(6) -1.003355 0.187593 -5.348577 0.0000 
C(7) 0.436447 0.058005 7.524311 0.0000 
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Persistency is the tendency of time series data to converge to its long run value. 
The persistence parameter, C(7), is small, implying that the variance moves rapidly 
through time. The asymmetry coefficient, C(6), is negative and significant, implying that 
the variance goes up more after negative residuals than after positive residuals. Also a 
negative C(6) suggests that volatility in the short-term interest rates can react 
asymmetrically to good and bad news in CDS rates. 
Impulse Response Analysis - Vector Auto-regression (VAR) Modeling 
For a bivariate function, VAR(p) is given by the following models: 
tptpttptpttt XXXYYYcY 1121211112121111 ......           (1) 
tptpttptpttt XXXYYYcX 2222212122221212 ......        (2) 
 To examine causal interactions between the short-term interest rates and CDS 
rates, VAR and accumulated impulse response functions were analyzed with Monte 
Carlo distribution errors that are carried over 10 months. The Accumulated Response to 
Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ±2 S.E. interactions are shown in Illustrations 3, 4 and 
5. From the Illustrations, the short-term interest rate appreciates when CDS rates 
increases, with a 2-month optimum impact lag. Also, the short-term interest rates 
depreciate when the inflation increases with a similar 2-month response lag. Lastly 
short-term interest rates appreciate when unemployment increases with a 2-month 
optimum impact lag. These impulse response functions confirm the robustness of the 
OLS and EGARCH regressions.  
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Illustration 3 - Accumulated Response of D(FEDFUNDS) to Dlog(USDEURO) 
 
 
Illustration 4 - Accumulated Response of D(FEDFUNDS) to Dlog(INFLATION) 
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Illustration 5 - Accumulated Response of D(FEDFUNDS) to D(UNEMPLOY) 
5.0 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This study examines the impact of CDS rates on short term interest rates policy. 
The aim of the paper is to provide a fresh contribution to literature by investigating data 
from 2005 to 2016.  
In summary, utilizing monthly time series data from 2005 to 2016, I conducted 
conventional regression [OLS], auto-regression, co-integration, VECM, ARCH/EGARCH 
and VAR analyses. From the OLS analyses, CDS rates appear to have a negative 
relationship with short-term interest rates. OLS with auto-regression, AR(8), improves this 
model with a slightly higher R-squared. AR(8) accounts for about 39% persistency. An 
EGARCH(1,1) specification fits the time series very well. From the VAR analysis with 
Monte Carlo distribution of errors that are carried over a ten-month period, short-term 
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interest rates depreciate when CDS rates appreciate thereby confirming the robustness 
of the OLS and EGARCH analyses.  
I conclude that there is evidence with regards to an impact of CDS rates on the 
short-term interest rates policy. The major policy implication of this study is that credit 
default swap rates appear to impact short-term interest rates. Thus, Central Banks need 
to conduct regular revision of policy targeting framework and instruments to capture the 
continual changes in CDS rates.  
Even though there exists evidence with regards to CDS rates impacting short-
term interest rates, the current study may have left out some important control variables. 
One such variable is output gap. The International Monetary Fund defines output gap as 
“an economic measure of the difference between the actual output of an economy and 
its potential output”. Thus, output gap measures the extent of inflation in an economy 
and can play a central role in policymaking. A study with output gap as an additional 
control variable is suggested for future research. 
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Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/09/17   Time: 04:39   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M12 2016M08  
Included observations: 129 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.026913 0.012654 -2.126832 0.0354 
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.320065 0.089279 -3.585002 0.0005 
     
     R-squared 0.091899    Mean dependent var -0.027907 
Adjusted R-squared 0.084748    S.D. dependent var 0.150191 
S.E. of regression 0.143686    Akaike info criterion -1.026993 
Sum squared resid 2.621993    Schwarz criterion -0.982655 
Log likelihood 68.24105    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.008978 
F-statistic 12.85224    Durbin-Watson stat 0.809417 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000479    
     
     
 
OLS + AUTO-REGRESSION 
 
Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
Method: ARMA Maximum Likelihood (OPG - BHHH)  
Date: 03/09/17   Time: 08:18   
Sample: 2005M12 2016M08   
Included observations: 129   
Convergence achieved after 74 iterations  
Coefficient covariance computed using outer product of gradients 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.019270 0.025787 -0.747252 0.4563 
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.244926 0.064830 -3.777970 0.0002 
AR(8) 0.385432 0.041007 9.399186 0.0000 
SIGMASQ 0.017404 0.001319 13.19256 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.222428    Mean dependent var -0.027907 
Adjusted R-squared 0.203766    S.D. dependent var 0.150191 
S.E. of regression 0.134018    Akaike info criterion -1.141191 
Sum squared resid 2.245112    Schwarz criterion -1.052515 
Log likelihood 77.60682    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.105160 
F-statistic 11.91891    Durbin-Watson stat 0.818192 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .89      .63+.63i    .63-.63i  .00-.89i 
 -.00+.89i     -.63-.63i   -.63-.63i      -.89 
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Controlling for Inflation and Unemployment 
 
 
Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/09/17   Time: 04:43   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M12 2016M08  
Included observations: 129 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.032765 0.013078 -2.505301 0.0135 
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.268832 0.092634 -2.902097 0.0044 
D(LOG(INFLATION)) 4.013502 2.436160 1.647471 0.1020 
D(UNEMPLOY) 0.096136 0.128961 0.745464 0.4574 
     
     R-squared 0.117855    Mean dependent var -0.027907 
Adjusted R-squared 0.096684    S.D. dependent var 0.150191 
S.E. of regression 0.142746    Akaike info criterion -1.024985 
Sum squared resid 2.547048    Schwarz criterion -0.936308 
Log likelihood 70.11152    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.988954 
F-statistic 5.566688    Durbin-Watson stat 0.800751 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001284    
     
     
 
 
Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
Method: ARMA Maximum Likelihood (OPG - BHHH)  
Date: 03/09/17   Time: 08:37   
Sample: 2005M12 2016M08   
Included observations: 129   
Convergence achieved after 59 iterations  
Coefficient covariance computed using outer product of gradients 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.024431 0.026857 -0.909646 0.3648 
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.199613 0.064599 -3.090009 0.0025 
D(LOG(INFLATION)) 3.444731 1.464968 2.351404 0.0203 
D(UNEMPLOY) 0.048748 0.165627 0.294326 0.7690 
AR(8) 0.387079 0.048771 7.936669 0.0000 
SIGMASQ 0.016929 0.001280 13.22249 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.243639    Mean dependent var -0.027907 
Adjusted R-squared 0.212892    S.D. dependent var 0.150191 
S.E. of regression 0.133248    Akaike info criterion -1.137748 
Sum squared resid 2.183868    Schwarz criterion -1.004734 
Log likelihood 79.38476    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.083702 
F-statistic 7.924146    Durbin-Watson stat 0.799709 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .89      .63-.63i    .63+.63i -.00-.89i 
 -.00+.89i     -.63-.63i   -.63-.63i      -.89 
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Co-integration test 
 
Date: 03/04/17   Time: 09:35   
Sample (adjusted): 2007M01 2016M08   
Included observations: 116 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: FEDFUNDS LOG(CDS)    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 13  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.108219  18.51147  15.49471  0.0170 
At most 1 *  0.044048  5.225505  3.841466  0.0223 
     
      Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None  0.108219  13.28597  14.26460  0.0709 
At most 1 *  0.044048  5.225505  3.841466  0.0223 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):  
     
     FEDFUNDS LOG(CDS)    
-0.314751  2.770774    
-1.035504 -5.200112    
     
          
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):   
     
     D(FEDFUNDS)  0.025073  0.007334   
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.029537  0.017088   
     
          
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  219.5317  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
FEDFUNDS LOG(CDS)    
 1.000000 -8.803063    
  (4.04771)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(FEDFUNDS) -0.007892    
  (0.00268)    
D(LOG(CDS))  0.009297    
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  (0.00394)    
     
     
 
 
    
 
 
 
Vector Error Correction Modeling (VECM) 
 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 03/04/17   Time: 10:11 
 Sample (adjusted): 2007M01 2016M08 
 Included observations: 116 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
   
   FEDFUNDS(-1)  1.000000  
   
LOG(CDS(-1)) -8.803063  
  (4.04771)  
 [-2.17483]  
   
C  38.54354  
   
   Error Correction: D(FEDFUNDS) D(LOG(CDS)) 
   
   CointEq1 -0.007892  0.009297 
  (0.00268)  (0.00394) 
 [-2.93971] [ 2.35712] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-1))  0.678531 -0.486361 
  (0.11240)  (0.16514) 
 [ 6.03687] [-2.94521] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-2))  0.015807  0.113770 
  (0.12228)  (0.17965) 
 [ 0.12927] [ 0.63327] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-3)) -0.096777  0.305979 
  (0.12015)  (0.17653) 
 [-0.80545] [ 1.73332] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-4)) -0.232853 -0.218402 
  (0.12019)  (0.17659) 
 [-1.93735] [-1.23680] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-5))  0.390975 -0.216406 
  (0.12445)  (0.18285) 
 [ 3.14155] [-1.18353] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-6))  0.009395  0.233870 
  (0.12026)  (0.17668) 
 [ 0.07813] [ 1.32368] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-7)) -0.482566 -0.109850 
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  (0.11300)  (0.16602) 
 [-4.27039] [-0.66165] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-8))  0.515521 -0.109064 
  (0.12672)  (0.18618) 
 [ 4.06809] [-0.58579] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-9))  0.116378  0.064081 
  (0.12436)  (0.18270) 
 [ 0.93585] [ 0.35074] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-10)) -0.085127  0.069730 
  (0.11907)  (0.17495) 
 [-0.71490] [ 0.39858] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-11)) -0.180147 -0.313161 
  (0.11526)  (0.16934) 
 [-1.56297] [-1.84930] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-12))  0.396795  0.046423 
  (0.11975)  (0.17594) 
 [ 3.31353] [ 0.26386] 
   
D(FEDFUNDS(-13)) -0.110059  0.125119 
  (0.10759)  (0.15808) 
 [-1.02293] [ 0.79151] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-1)))  0.050096 -0.083573 
  (0.07700)  (0.11313) 
 [ 0.65059] [-0.73873] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-2))) -0.138289 -0.195635 
  (0.07221)  (0.10609) 
 [-1.91516] [-1.84407] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-3))) -0.073632 -0.003920 
  (0.07587)  (0.11147) 
 [-0.97050] [-0.03516] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-4)))  0.061503 -0.038690 
  (0.07586)  (0.11145) 
 [ 0.81077] [-0.34715] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-5)))  0.089172  0.020727 
  (0.07705)  (0.11320) 
 [ 1.15735] [ 0.18309] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-6))) -0.260816  0.027146 
  (0.07754)  (0.11392) 
 [-3.36380] [ 0.23829] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-7))) -0.104561 -0.044825 
  (0.08222)  (0.12079) 
 [-1.27179] [-0.37109] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-8))) -0.052034  0.000499 
  (0.07687)  (0.11294) 
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 [-0.67688] [ 0.00442] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-9))) -0.072500 -0.145485 
  (0.07721)  (0.11345) 
 [-0.93894] [-1.28243] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-10))) -0.022827 -0.050295 
  (0.07825)  (0.11496) 
 [-0.29174] [-0.43749] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-11)))  0.103154 -0.183037 
  (0.07874)  (0.11569) 
 [ 1.31006] [-1.58220] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-12)))  0.182121  0.108222 
  (0.07632)  (0.11213) 
 [ 2.38634] [ 0.96517] 
   
D(LOG(CDS(-13))) -0.051856 -0.019536 
  (0.07942)  (0.11668) 
 [-0.65295] [-0.16743] 
   
C -0.001059 -0.010429 
  (0.00997)  (0.01465) 
 [-0.10625] [-0.71194] 
   
    R-squared  0.710570  0.339843 
 Adj. R-squared  0.621767  0.137295 
 Sum sq. resids  0.742579  1.602921 
 S.E. equation  0.091861  0.134963 
 F-statistic  8.001685  1.677840 
 Log likelihood  128.3737  83.74537 
 Akaike AIC -1.730581 -0.961127 
 Schwarz SC -1.065921 -0.296467 
 Mean dependent -0.041724  0.006494 
 S.D. dependent  0.149365  0.145306 
   
    Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.000135 
 Determinant resid covariance  7.78E-05 
 Log likelihood  219.5317 
 Akaike information criterion -2.785029 
 Schwarz criterion -1.408234 
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Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
Method: Least Squares (Gauss-Newton / Marquardt steps) 
Date: 03/04/17   Time: 10:23   
Sample (adjusted): 2007M01 2016M08  
Included observations: 116 after adjustments  
D(FEDFUNDS) = C(1)*( FEDFUNDS(-1) - 8.80306271734*LOG(CDS(-1)) + 
        38.5435394264 ) + C(2)*D(FEDFUNDS(-1)) + C(3)*D(FEDFUNDS(-2))  
        + C(4)*D(FEDFUNDS(-3)) + C(5)*D(FEDFUNDS(-4)) + C(6) 
        *D(FEDFUNDS(-5)) + C(7)*D(FEDFUNDS(-6)) + C(8)*D(FEDFUNDS( 
        -7)) + C(9)*D(FEDFUNDS(-8)) + C(10)*D(FEDFUNDS(-9)) + C(11) 
        *D(FEDFUNDS(-10)) + C(12)*D(FEDFUNDS(-11)) + C(13) 
        *D(FEDFUNDS(-12)) + C(14)*D(FEDFUNDS(-13)) + C(15) 
        *D(LOG(CDS(-1))) + C(16)*D(LOG(CDS(-2))) + C(17)*D(LOG(CDS(-3))) 
        + C(18)*D(LOG(CDS(-4))) + C(19)*D(LOG(CDS(-5))) + C(20) 
        *D(LOG(CDS(-6))) + C(21)*D(LOG(CDS(-7))) + C(22)*D(LOG(CDS(-8))) 
        + C(23)*D(LOG(CDS(-9))) + C(24)*D(LOG(CDS(-10))) + C(25) 
        *D(LOG(CDS(-11))) + C(26)*D(LOG(CDS(-12))) + C(27)*D(LOG(CDS( 
        -13))) + C(28)   
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) -0.007892 0.002685 -2.939708 0.0042 
C(2) 0.678531 0.112398 6.036871 0.0000 
C(3) 0.015807 0.122279 0.129266 0.8974 
C(4) -0.096777 0.120151 -0.805455 0.4227 
C(5) -0.232853 0.120191 -1.937355 0.0559 
C(6) 0.390975 0.124453 3.141545 0.0023 
C(7) 0.009395 0.120256 0.078126 0.9379 
C(8) -0.482566 0.113003 -4.270393 0.0000 
C(9) 0.515521 0.126723 4.068095 0.0001 
C(10) 0.116378 0.124356 0.935846 0.3519 
C(11) -0.085127 0.119074 -0.714905 0.4766 
C(12) -0.180147 0.115259 -1.562971 0.1216 
C(13) 0.396795 0.119750 3.313526 0.0013 
C(14) -0.110059 0.107593 -1.022926 0.3091 
C(15) 0.050096 0.077001 0.650591 0.5170 
C(16) -0.138289 0.072208 -1.915159 0.0587 
C(17) -0.073632 0.075870 -0.970502 0.3345 
C(18) 0.061503 0.075857 0.810775 0.4197 
C(19) 0.089172 0.077049 1.157346 0.2503 
C(20) -0.260816 0.077536 -3.363795 0.0011 
C(21) -0.104561 0.082216 -1.271786 0.2068 
C(22) -0.052034 0.076873 -0.676880 0.5003 
C(23) -0.072500 0.077215 -0.938936 0.3503 
C(24) -0.022827 0.078246 -0.291739 0.7712 
C(25) 0.103154 0.078739 1.310065 0.1936 
C(26) 0.182121 0.076318 2.386342 0.0192 
C(27) -0.051856 0.079419 -0.652947 0.5155 
C(28) -0.001059 0.009971 -0.106253 0.9156 
     
     R-squared 0.710570    Mean dependent var -0.041724 
Adjusted R-squared 0.621767    S.D. dependent var 0.149365 
S.E. of regression 0.091861    Akaike info criterion -1.730581 
Sum squared resid 0.742579    Schwarz criterion -1.065921 
Log likelihood 128.3737    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.460767 
F-statistic 8.001685    Durbin-Watson stat 2.041119 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Wald Test: to check the short run causality from CDS to FFR 
 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    F-statistic  2.968096 (13, 88)  0.0012 
Chi-square  38.58524  13  0.0002 
    
        
Null Hypothesis: C(15)=C(16)=C(17)=C(18)=C(19)=C(20)= 
        C(21)=C(22)=C(23)=C(24)=C(25)=C(26)=C(27)=0 
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    C(15)  0.050096  0.077001 
C(16) -0.138289  0.072208 
C(17) -0.073632  0.075870 
C(18)  0.061503  0.075857 
C(19)  0.089172  0.077049 
C(20) -0.260816  0.077536 
C(21) -0.104561  0.082216 
C(22) -0.052034  0.076873 
C(23) -0.072500  0.077215 
C(24) -0.022827  0.078246 
C(25)  0.103154  0.078739 
C(26)  0.182121  0.076318 
C(27) -0.051856  0.079419 
    
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
 
reject Null. C is not zero. There’s a short run causality from CDS to FFR 
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Model Robustness Tests: 
 
o Serial correlation 
o Heteroskedascity 
o Normal distribution 
 
Serial correlation 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.915141    Prob. F(13,75) 0.5417 
Obs*R-squared 15.88127    Prob. Chi-Square(13) 0.2556 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/17   Time: 10:53   
Sample: 2007M01 2016M08   
Included observations: 116   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 0.016470 0.045607 0.361132 0.7190 
C(2) 1.626497 3.999792 0.406645 0.6854 
C(3) -0.901265 1.618777 -0.556757 0.5794 
C(4) -0.121966 0.627720 -0.194300 0.8465 
C(5) 0.041094 0.390324 0.105282 0.9164 
C(6) 0.492614 1.177178 0.418470 0.6768 
C(7) -0.386934 1.310324 -0.295296 0.7686 
C(8) -0.222324 0.482585 -0.460695 0.6464 
C(9) 0.635092 1.863165 0.340868 0.7342 
C(10) -0.686670 1.575209 -0.435923 0.6641 
C(11) -0.119660 0.923584 -0.129561 0.8973 
C(12) 0.099869 0.201022 0.496805 0.6208 
C(13) 0.279200 0.809411 0.344942 0.7311 
C(14) -0.615439 1.376109 -0.447232 0.6560 
C(15) 0.156886 0.414630 0.378376 0.7062 
C(16) 0.000878 0.115496 0.007599 0.9940 
C(17) 0.204423 0.552270 0.370151 0.7123 
C(18) 0.176086 0.473263 0.372068 0.7109 
C(19) -0.065683 0.141507 -0.464168 0.6439 
C(20) -0.155216 0.408465 -0.379998 0.7050 
C(21) 0.372809 0.943288 0.395223 0.6938 
C(22) 0.302349 0.732098 0.412989 0.6808 
C(23) 0.166982 0.442761 0.377139 0.7071 
C(24) 0.077418 0.415440 0.186352 0.8527 
C(25) 0.002115 0.250006 0.008459 0.9933 
C(26) -0.147506 0.344233 -0.428506 0.6695 
C(27) -0.250420 0.830524 -0.301521 0.7639 
C(28) 0.001704 0.012106 0.140768 0.8884 
RESID(-1) -1.680566 4.048173 -0.415142 0.6792 
RESID(-2) -0.077191 1.222989 -0.063117 0.9498 
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RESID(-3) -0.024021 0.488644 -0.049159 0.9609 
RESID(-4) 0.027718 0.331386 0.083642 0.9336 
RESID(-5) -0.079511 0.332269 -0.239298 0.8115 
RESID(-6) -0.218586 0.241000 -0.906997 0.3673 
RESID(-7) -0.133812 0.220161 -0.607794 0.5452 
RESID(-8) 0.129156 0.218205 0.591903 0.5557 
RESID(-9) 0.232324 0.210867 1.101752 0.2741 
RESID(-10) -0.141155 0.206427 -0.683801 0.4962 
RESID(-11) -0.386975 0.205005 -1.887636 0.0629 
RESID(-12) -0.220992 0.197088 -1.121287 0.2657 
RESID(-13) 0.183389 0.195590 0.937617 0.3515 
     
     R-squared 0.136907    Mean dependent var -1.44E-18 
Adjusted R-squared -0.323409    S.D. dependent var 0.080357 
S.E. of regression 0.092442    Akaike info criterion -1.653677 
Sum squared resid 0.640914    Schwarz criterion -0.680425 
Log likelihood 136.9132    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.258592 
F-statistic 0.297421    Durbin-Watson stat 1.997577 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999967    
     
     
 
No serial correlation 
 
Heteroskedascity 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     F-statistic 1.542774    Prob. F(28,87) 0.0660 
Obs*R-squared 38.48709    Prob. Chi-Square(28) 0.0895 
Scaled explained SS 154.6612    Prob. Chi-Square(28) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/17   Time: 10:56   
Sample: 2007M01 2016M08   
Included observations: 116   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.004548 0.012094 0.376018 0.7078 
FEDFUNDS(-1) -0.057666 0.026568 -2.170500 0.0327 
CDS(-1) -0.000234 0.000195 -1.197902 0.2342 
FEDFUNDS(-2) 0.038664 0.048129 0.803328 0.4240 
FEDFUNDS(-3) 0.033827 0.049347 0.685495 0.4949 
FEDFUNDS(-4) 1.32E-05 0.049310 0.000267 0.9998 
FEDFUNDS(-5) -0.009856 0.051175 -0.192594 0.8477 
FEDFUNDS(-6) -0.079187 0.053077 -1.491919 0.1393 
FEDFUNDS(-7) 0.178442 0.049881 3.577375 0.0006 
FEDFUNDS(-8) -0.109192 0.051334 -2.127082 0.0362 
FEDFUNDS(-9) -0.016548 0.055731 -0.296933 0.7672 
FEDFUNDS(-10) 0.002937 0.051560 0.056957 0.9547 
FEDFUNDS(-11) 0.065450 0.051910 1.260842 0.2107 
FEDFUNDS(-12) -0.028631 0.050826 -0.563319 0.5747 
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FEDFUNDS(-13) -0.057764 0.051577 -1.119948 0.2658 
FEDFUNDS(-14) 0.041990 0.028917 1.452093 0.1501 
CDS(-2) 0.000209 0.000253 0.822869 0.4128 
CDS(-3) -7.45E-05 0.000249 -0.298926 0.7657 
CDS(-4) -9.36E-05 0.000251 -0.373003 0.7101 
CDS(-5) -0.000173 0.000262 -0.659298 0.5114 
CDS(-6) 0.000911 0.000266 3.430792 0.0009 
CDS(-7) -0.000252 0.000281 -0.897540 0.3719 
CDS(-8) -0.000373 0.000268 -1.390420 0.1679 
CDS(-9) -0.000193 0.000249 -0.771923 0.4423 
CDS(-10) 0.000210 0.000248 0.844860 0.4005 
CDS(-11) 0.000140 0.000244 0.574719 0.5670 
CDS(-12) -0.000129 0.000234 -0.548927 0.5845 
CDS(-13) 4.26E-05 0.000232 0.183739 0.8546 
CDS(-14) -2.23E-05 0.000179 -0.125094 0.9007 
     
     R-squared 0.331785    Mean dependent var 0.006402 
Adjusted R-squared 0.116728    S.D. dependent var 0.024026 
S.E. of regression 0.022581    Akaike info criterion -4.531135 
Sum squared resid 0.044360    Schwarz criterion -3.842737 
Log likelihood 291.8058    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.251685 
F-statistic 1.542774    Durbin-Watson stat 2.337389 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.066030    
     
     
 
No Heteroskedascity 
 
Normal 
 
 
 
Not normally distributed 
 
 
0
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Series: Residuals
Sample 2007M01 2016M08
Observations 116
Mean      -1.44e-18
Median   0.004720
Maximum  0.172574
Minimum -0.501431
Std. Dev.   0.080357
Skewness  -2.112997
Kurtosis   14.96519
Jarque-Bera  778.2863
Probability  0.000000
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ARCH/EGARCH 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
     
     F-statistic 7.071249    Prob. F(1,126) 0.0089 
Obs*R-squared 6.801769    Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0091 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/09/17   Time: 11:15   
Sample (adjusted): 2006M01 2016M08  
Included observations: 128 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.013271 0.006353 2.088831 0.0387 
RESID^2(-1) 0.230535 0.086694 2.659182 0.0089 
     
     R-squared 0.053139    Mean dependent var 0.017311 
Adjusted R-squared 0.045624    S.D. dependent var 0.071446 
S.E. of regression 0.069797    Akaike info criterion -2.470959 
Sum squared resid 0.613819    Schwarz criterion -2.426396 
Log likelihood 160.1414    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.452853 
F-statistic 7.071249    Durbin-Watson stat 2.050538 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.008850    
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Dependent Variable: D(FEDFUNDS)  
Method: ML ARCH - Generalized error distribution (GED) (BFGS / Marquardt 
        steps)    
Date: 03/09/17   Time: 11:19   
Sample (adjusted): 2006M08 2016M08  
Included observations: 121 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 59 iterations  
Coefficient covariance computed using outer product of gradients 
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GED parameter fixed at 2   
LOG(GARCH) = C(4) + C(5)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + C(6) 
        *RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(7)*LOG(GARCH(-1)) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.003772 0.001040 -3.627773 0.0003 
D(LOG(CDS)) -0.080707 0.004985 -16.19073 0.0000 
AR(8) -0.076794 0.008415 -9.125477 0.0000 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C(4) -5.244092 0.396713 -13.21886 0.0000 
C(5) 2.253551 0.182905 12.32086 0.0000 
C(6) -1.003355 0.187593 -5.348577 0.0000 
C(7) 0.436447 0.058005 7.524311 0.0000 
     
     R-squared -0.094589    Mean dependent var -0.040000 
Adjusted R-squared -0.113141    S.D. dependent var 0.146464 
S.E. of regression 0.154527    Akaike info criterion -3.497203 
Sum squared resid 2.817690    Schwarz criterion -3.335463 
Log likelihood 218.5808    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.431514 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.651871    
     
     Inverted AR Roots  .67+.28i      .67-.28i    .28-.67i  .28+.67i 
 -.28-.67i     -.28+.67i   -.67-.28i -.67+.28i 
     
     
 
 
 
 
